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What criticisms of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language have been offered?
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In a 2003 obituary, Anna Sherrat described one of my many philosophy heroes, Donald Davidson, as “one of the greatest American philosophers.” She did an excellent job of summarizing one of the perspectives of one of the most respected philosophers of the 20th century, as follows:
[W]e can ascribe beliefs to a speaker only on the basis of prior assumptions about meaning, and vice versa…there will be many different assignments of meaning and belief that fit equally well with a given speaker’s behaviour.
I understand that Wittgenstein transformed the field of philosophy of language with his insight that while objective definitions consists of language, we understand linguistic utterances by interpreting subjective meanings, and we do that according to our individual histories of learning how those utterances were used by the people we’ve known to use them. In fewer words, meaning derives from usage.
As he wrote in Philosophical Investigations, 1953, “the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (Quoted here by Anat Biletzki). He invented the term “language games” to refer to the many different ways that language may be used.
In his IEP article on philosophy of language, Michael P. Wolf reflects a consensus in the field that Wittgenstein’s theory, developed over half a century ago, has yet to be superseded:
[I]t can be safely said that Wittgenstein rejected a picture of language as a detached, logical sort of picturing of the facts and inserted a concern for its pragmatic dimensions. One cannot look at the representational dimension of language alone and expect to understand what meaning is. [https://www.iep.utm.edu/lang-phi/#SH3b]
My question is: Does anyone here know of any philosophy book or article (published in that last fifty years), which offers cogent criticism to refute or weaken these theses?
philosophy-of-language wittgenstein semantics contemporary-philosophy
|
show 11 more comments
In a 2003 obituary, Anna Sherrat described one of my many philosophy heroes, Donald Davidson, as “one of the greatest American philosophers.” She did an excellent job of summarizing one of the perspectives of one of the most respected philosophers of the 20th century, as follows:
[W]e can ascribe beliefs to a speaker only on the basis of prior assumptions about meaning, and vice versa…there will be many different assignments of meaning and belief that fit equally well with a given speaker’s behaviour.
I understand that Wittgenstein transformed the field of philosophy of language with his insight that while objective definitions consists of language, we understand linguistic utterances by interpreting subjective meanings, and we do that according to our individual histories of learning how those utterances were used by the people we’ve known to use them. In fewer words, meaning derives from usage.
As he wrote in Philosophical Investigations, 1953, “the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (Quoted here by Anat Biletzki). He invented the term “language games” to refer to the many different ways that language may be used.
In his IEP article on philosophy of language, Michael P. Wolf reflects a consensus in the field that Wittgenstein’s theory, developed over half a century ago, has yet to be superseded:
[I]t can be safely said that Wittgenstein rejected a picture of language as a detached, logical sort of picturing of the facts and inserted a concern for its pragmatic dimensions. One cannot look at the representational dimension of language alone and expect to understand what meaning is. [https://www.iep.utm.edu/lang-phi/#SH3b]
My question is: Does anyone here know of any philosophy book or article (published in that last fifty years), which offers cogent criticism to refute or weaken these theses?
philosophy-of-language wittgenstein semantics contemporary-philosophy
1
How does the IEP quote on Wittgenstein "reflect a consensus in the field that Wittgenstein’s theory, developed over half a century ago, has yet to be superseded"? I don't see it.
– Eliran
5 hours ago
@Eliran I'm guessing that this is because W's theory goes beyond the minimalism of D's theory by adding modal imagination to our concept of meaning.
– Nick R
4 hours ago
1
"Refute" is a strong word. Are you asking about criticisms.
– Nick R
4 hours ago
1
It would help if you didn't have off-topic asides like the sentence about Sherrat complimenting Davidson. And this first paragraph is over-laboured too.
– curiousdannii
53 mins ago
1
@Rortian Of course I'm not certain all my beliefs are absolutely true. Not sure what that's got to do with improving this question and helping you make it more focused and concise.
– curiousdannii
32 mins ago
|
show 11 more comments
In a 2003 obituary, Anna Sherrat described one of my many philosophy heroes, Donald Davidson, as “one of the greatest American philosophers.” She did an excellent job of summarizing one of the perspectives of one of the most respected philosophers of the 20th century, as follows:
[W]e can ascribe beliefs to a speaker only on the basis of prior assumptions about meaning, and vice versa…there will be many different assignments of meaning and belief that fit equally well with a given speaker’s behaviour.
I understand that Wittgenstein transformed the field of philosophy of language with his insight that while objective definitions consists of language, we understand linguistic utterances by interpreting subjective meanings, and we do that according to our individual histories of learning how those utterances were used by the people we’ve known to use them. In fewer words, meaning derives from usage.
As he wrote in Philosophical Investigations, 1953, “the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (Quoted here by Anat Biletzki). He invented the term “language games” to refer to the many different ways that language may be used.
In his IEP article on philosophy of language, Michael P. Wolf reflects a consensus in the field that Wittgenstein’s theory, developed over half a century ago, has yet to be superseded:
[I]t can be safely said that Wittgenstein rejected a picture of language as a detached, logical sort of picturing of the facts and inserted a concern for its pragmatic dimensions. One cannot look at the representational dimension of language alone and expect to understand what meaning is. [https://www.iep.utm.edu/lang-phi/#SH3b]
My question is: Does anyone here know of any philosophy book or article (published in that last fifty years), which offers cogent criticism to refute or weaken these theses?
philosophy-of-language wittgenstein semantics contemporary-philosophy
In a 2003 obituary, Anna Sherrat described one of my many philosophy heroes, Donald Davidson, as “one of the greatest American philosophers.” She did an excellent job of summarizing one of the perspectives of one of the most respected philosophers of the 20th century, as follows:
[W]e can ascribe beliefs to a speaker only on the basis of prior assumptions about meaning, and vice versa…there will be many different assignments of meaning and belief that fit equally well with a given speaker’s behaviour.
I understand that Wittgenstein transformed the field of philosophy of language with his insight that while objective definitions consists of language, we understand linguistic utterances by interpreting subjective meanings, and we do that according to our individual histories of learning how those utterances were used by the people we’ve known to use them. In fewer words, meaning derives from usage.
As he wrote in Philosophical Investigations, 1953, “the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (Quoted here by Anat Biletzki). He invented the term “language games” to refer to the many different ways that language may be used.
In his IEP article on philosophy of language, Michael P. Wolf reflects a consensus in the field that Wittgenstein’s theory, developed over half a century ago, has yet to be superseded:
[I]t can be safely said that Wittgenstein rejected a picture of language as a detached, logical sort of picturing of the facts and inserted a concern for its pragmatic dimensions. One cannot look at the representational dimension of language alone and expect to understand what meaning is. [https://www.iep.utm.edu/lang-phi/#SH3b]
My question is: Does anyone here know of any philosophy book or article (published in that last fifty years), which offers cogent criticism to refute or weaken these theses?
philosophy-of-language wittgenstein semantics contemporary-philosophy
philosophy-of-language wittgenstein semantics contemporary-philosophy
edited 13 mins ago
curiousdannii
530718
530718
asked 6 hours ago
RortianRortian
15611
15611
1
How does the IEP quote on Wittgenstein "reflect a consensus in the field that Wittgenstein’s theory, developed over half a century ago, has yet to be superseded"? I don't see it.
– Eliran
5 hours ago
@Eliran I'm guessing that this is because W's theory goes beyond the minimalism of D's theory by adding modal imagination to our concept of meaning.
– Nick R
4 hours ago
1
"Refute" is a strong word. Are you asking about criticisms.
– Nick R
4 hours ago
1
It would help if you didn't have off-topic asides like the sentence about Sherrat complimenting Davidson. And this first paragraph is over-laboured too.
– curiousdannii
53 mins ago
1
@Rortian Of course I'm not certain all my beliefs are absolutely true. Not sure what that's got to do with improving this question and helping you make it more focused and concise.
– curiousdannii
32 mins ago
|
show 11 more comments
1
How does the IEP quote on Wittgenstein "reflect a consensus in the field that Wittgenstein’s theory, developed over half a century ago, has yet to be superseded"? I don't see it.
– Eliran
5 hours ago
@Eliran I'm guessing that this is because W's theory goes beyond the minimalism of D's theory by adding modal imagination to our concept of meaning.
– Nick R
4 hours ago
1
"Refute" is a strong word. Are you asking about criticisms.
– Nick R
4 hours ago
1
It would help if you didn't have off-topic asides like the sentence about Sherrat complimenting Davidson. And this first paragraph is over-laboured too.
– curiousdannii
53 mins ago
1
@Rortian Of course I'm not certain all my beliefs are absolutely true. Not sure what that's got to do with improving this question and helping you make it more focused and concise.
– curiousdannii
32 mins ago
1
1
How does the IEP quote on Wittgenstein "reflect a consensus in the field that Wittgenstein’s theory, developed over half a century ago, has yet to be superseded"? I don't see it.
– Eliran
5 hours ago
How does the IEP quote on Wittgenstein "reflect a consensus in the field that Wittgenstein’s theory, developed over half a century ago, has yet to be superseded"? I don't see it.
– Eliran
5 hours ago
@Eliran I'm guessing that this is because W's theory goes beyond the minimalism of D's theory by adding modal imagination to our concept of meaning.
– Nick R
4 hours ago
@Eliran I'm guessing that this is because W's theory goes beyond the minimalism of D's theory by adding modal imagination to our concept of meaning.
– Nick R
4 hours ago
1
1
"Refute" is a strong word. Are you asking about criticisms.
– Nick R
4 hours ago
"Refute" is a strong word. Are you asking about criticisms.
– Nick R
4 hours ago
1
1
It would help if you didn't have off-topic asides like the sentence about Sherrat complimenting Davidson. And this first paragraph is over-laboured too.
– curiousdannii
53 mins ago
It would help if you didn't have off-topic asides like the sentence about Sherrat complimenting Davidson. And this first paragraph is over-laboured too.
– curiousdannii
53 mins ago
1
1
@Rortian Of course I'm not certain all my beliefs are absolutely true. Not sure what that's got to do with improving this question and helping you make it more focused and concise.
– curiousdannii
32 mins ago
@Rortian Of course I'm not certain all my beliefs are absolutely true. Not sure what that's got to do with improving this question and helping you make it more focused and concise.
– curiousdannii
32 mins ago
|
show 11 more comments
1 Answer
1
active
oldest
votes
Colin McGinn, in his book The Philosophy of Language, discusses at least four criticisms of Davidson's theory.
Is it enough to say that knowledge of meaning is knowledge of truth conditions - especially when we restrict ourselves homophonic statements of truth conditions? Can't we ask what this knowledge of truth conditions itself involves?
We need to assign more than reference to a name if we are to capture its full meaning. We need something like sense. But Tarski's semantic apparatus does not specify sense. How then can it function as a theory of meaning. At best it is a theory of reference.
Davidson's theory provides no explanation of how words come to have semantic properties. The axioms say things like "'Hesperus' denotes Hesperus", but nothing in the theory tells us how it is that a word like "Hesperus" acquires reference. Similarly for predicates and satisfaction. The axioms do not explain what gives marks and sounds the semantic features they have.
Davidson distinguishes sharply between giving logical forms for sentences and giving analysis of individual words. But how robust is that distinction? The intuitive idea that Davidson is working with is that in attributing logical forms we do not break words down into parts, but in lexical analyses we do. [Yet] Davidson's own theory of adverbs construes sentences containing adverbs as quantifications over events with predicates of events. The logical form here is quite different from the superficial syntax of the sentence. The paraphrase finds hidden semantic complexity in adverbs. Why isn't this a case of lexical analysis?
Thanks for this. I'd be happy to think a bit about it, but I'd need to have the words that Davidson and Colin used in order to deal with the meanings of the criticisms (and I have other priorities...!), but if you want to work with me we can figure this out. I have some questions about your questions, though. Is it enough to say that knowledge of meaning is knowledge of truth Does this use of the term ‘knowledge’ refer to uncertain knowledge? Can't we ask what this knowledge of truth conditions itself involves? Umm, why wouldn’t we? Preconceptions don’t work in my perspective.
– Rortian
3 hours ago
2.We need to assign more than reference to a name if we are to capture its full meaning. We need something like sense. But Tarski's semantic apparatus does not specify sense. How then can it function as a theory of meaning. At best it is a theory of reference. Does "full meaning" refer to objective meaning? In the absence of "full" objectivity, I'm not clear that Davidson would dispute this...are you clear about what Davidson would think? Unfortunately, he won't be able to tell us...we can be fairly certain and quite correct about that...
– Rortian
3 hours ago
3. Umm, didn't Davidson accept Wittgenstein's approach? Does McGinn agree?
– Rortian
3 hours ago
4.Davidson distinguishes sharply between giving logical forms for sentences and giving analysis of individual words. But how robust is that distinction? Didn't Wittgenstein develop the theory of language games to overcome the insuperable difficulty of demonstrating that words carry meanings? Utterances occur in sociolinguistic contexts, right? They're interpreted - it seemed to some people and still does - according the history of learning of whoever connotes them...how do you assess how "superficial" syntax is or how "complex" the semantics are...why does that matter?
– Rortian
3 hours ago
1
@Rortian McGinn's book is an introductory, undergraduate level text which surveys ten classic papers in the philosophy of language. I don't think he has an agenda, as such. He characterises Davidson's response to such criticisms as being that from the point of view of philosophical semantics he has achieved his aim - namely, to specify meanings systematically and show how an "infinite mastery can proceed from a finite basis." According to McGinn, Davidson leaves it to psychologists to say more about linguistic meaning. I currently lack sufficient understanding to add to McGinn's comments.
– Nick R
2 hours ago
|
show 2 more comments
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Colin McGinn, in his book The Philosophy of Language, discusses at least four criticisms of Davidson's theory.
Is it enough to say that knowledge of meaning is knowledge of truth conditions - especially when we restrict ourselves homophonic statements of truth conditions? Can't we ask what this knowledge of truth conditions itself involves?
We need to assign more than reference to a name if we are to capture its full meaning. We need something like sense. But Tarski's semantic apparatus does not specify sense. How then can it function as a theory of meaning. At best it is a theory of reference.
Davidson's theory provides no explanation of how words come to have semantic properties. The axioms say things like "'Hesperus' denotes Hesperus", but nothing in the theory tells us how it is that a word like "Hesperus" acquires reference. Similarly for predicates and satisfaction. The axioms do not explain what gives marks and sounds the semantic features they have.
Davidson distinguishes sharply between giving logical forms for sentences and giving analysis of individual words. But how robust is that distinction? The intuitive idea that Davidson is working with is that in attributing logical forms we do not break words down into parts, but in lexical analyses we do. [Yet] Davidson's own theory of adverbs construes sentences containing adverbs as quantifications over events with predicates of events. The logical form here is quite different from the superficial syntax of the sentence. The paraphrase finds hidden semantic complexity in adverbs. Why isn't this a case of lexical analysis?
Thanks for this. I'd be happy to think a bit about it, but I'd need to have the words that Davidson and Colin used in order to deal with the meanings of the criticisms (and I have other priorities...!), but if you want to work with me we can figure this out. I have some questions about your questions, though. Is it enough to say that knowledge of meaning is knowledge of truth Does this use of the term ‘knowledge’ refer to uncertain knowledge? Can't we ask what this knowledge of truth conditions itself involves? Umm, why wouldn’t we? Preconceptions don’t work in my perspective.
– Rortian
3 hours ago
2.We need to assign more than reference to a name if we are to capture its full meaning. We need something like sense. But Tarski's semantic apparatus does not specify sense. How then can it function as a theory of meaning. At best it is a theory of reference. Does "full meaning" refer to objective meaning? In the absence of "full" objectivity, I'm not clear that Davidson would dispute this...are you clear about what Davidson would think? Unfortunately, he won't be able to tell us...we can be fairly certain and quite correct about that...
– Rortian
3 hours ago
3. Umm, didn't Davidson accept Wittgenstein's approach? Does McGinn agree?
– Rortian
3 hours ago
4.Davidson distinguishes sharply between giving logical forms for sentences and giving analysis of individual words. But how robust is that distinction? Didn't Wittgenstein develop the theory of language games to overcome the insuperable difficulty of demonstrating that words carry meanings? Utterances occur in sociolinguistic contexts, right? They're interpreted - it seemed to some people and still does - according the history of learning of whoever connotes them...how do you assess how "superficial" syntax is or how "complex" the semantics are...why does that matter?
– Rortian
3 hours ago
1
@Rortian McGinn's book is an introductory, undergraduate level text which surveys ten classic papers in the philosophy of language. I don't think he has an agenda, as such. He characterises Davidson's response to such criticisms as being that from the point of view of philosophical semantics he has achieved his aim - namely, to specify meanings systematically and show how an "infinite mastery can proceed from a finite basis." According to McGinn, Davidson leaves it to psychologists to say more about linguistic meaning. I currently lack sufficient understanding to add to McGinn's comments.
– Nick R
2 hours ago
|
show 2 more comments
Colin McGinn, in his book The Philosophy of Language, discusses at least four criticisms of Davidson's theory.
Is it enough to say that knowledge of meaning is knowledge of truth conditions - especially when we restrict ourselves homophonic statements of truth conditions? Can't we ask what this knowledge of truth conditions itself involves?
We need to assign more than reference to a name if we are to capture its full meaning. We need something like sense. But Tarski's semantic apparatus does not specify sense. How then can it function as a theory of meaning. At best it is a theory of reference.
Davidson's theory provides no explanation of how words come to have semantic properties. The axioms say things like "'Hesperus' denotes Hesperus", but nothing in the theory tells us how it is that a word like "Hesperus" acquires reference. Similarly for predicates and satisfaction. The axioms do not explain what gives marks and sounds the semantic features they have.
Davidson distinguishes sharply between giving logical forms for sentences and giving analysis of individual words. But how robust is that distinction? The intuitive idea that Davidson is working with is that in attributing logical forms we do not break words down into parts, but in lexical analyses we do. [Yet] Davidson's own theory of adverbs construes sentences containing adverbs as quantifications over events with predicates of events. The logical form here is quite different from the superficial syntax of the sentence. The paraphrase finds hidden semantic complexity in adverbs. Why isn't this a case of lexical analysis?
Thanks for this. I'd be happy to think a bit about it, but I'd need to have the words that Davidson and Colin used in order to deal with the meanings of the criticisms (and I have other priorities...!), but if you want to work with me we can figure this out. I have some questions about your questions, though. Is it enough to say that knowledge of meaning is knowledge of truth Does this use of the term ‘knowledge’ refer to uncertain knowledge? Can't we ask what this knowledge of truth conditions itself involves? Umm, why wouldn’t we? Preconceptions don’t work in my perspective.
– Rortian
3 hours ago
2.We need to assign more than reference to a name if we are to capture its full meaning. We need something like sense. But Tarski's semantic apparatus does not specify sense. How then can it function as a theory of meaning. At best it is a theory of reference. Does "full meaning" refer to objective meaning? In the absence of "full" objectivity, I'm not clear that Davidson would dispute this...are you clear about what Davidson would think? Unfortunately, he won't be able to tell us...we can be fairly certain and quite correct about that...
– Rortian
3 hours ago
3. Umm, didn't Davidson accept Wittgenstein's approach? Does McGinn agree?
– Rortian
3 hours ago
4.Davidson distinguishes sharply between giving logical forms for sentences and giving analysis of individual words. But how robust is that distinction? Didn't Wittgenstein develop the theory of language games to overcome the insuperable difficulty of demonstrating that words carry meanings? Utterances occur in sociolinguistic contexts, right? They're interpreted - it seemed to some people and still does - according the history of learning of whoever connotes them...how do you assess how "superficial" syntax is or how "complex" the semantics are...why does that matter?
– Rortian
3 hours ago
1
@Rortian McGinn's book is an introductory, undergraduate level text which surveys ten classic papers in the philosophy of language. I don't think he has an agenda, as such. He characterises Davidson's response to such criticisms as being that from the point of view of philosophical semantics he has achieved his aim - namely, to specify meanings systematically and show how an "infinite mastery can proceed from a finite basis." According to McGinn, Davidson leaves it to psychologists to say more about linguistic meaning. I currently lack sufficient understanding to add to McGinn's comments.
– Nick R
2 hours ago
|
show 2 more comments
Colin McGinn, in his book The Philosophy of Language, discusses at least four criticisms of Davidson's theory.
Is it enough to say that knowledge of meaning is knowledge of truth conditions - especially when we restrict ourselves homophonic statements of truth conditions? Can't we ask what this knowledge of truth conditions itself involves?
We need to assign more than reference to a name if we are to capture its full meaning. We need something like sense. But Tarski's semantic apparatus does not specify sense. How then can it function as a theory of meaning. At best it is a theory of reference.
Davidson's theory provides no explanation of how words come to have semantic properties. The axioms say things like "'Hesperus' denotes Hesperus", but nothing in the theory tells us how it is that a word like "Hesperus" acquires reference. Similarly for predicates and satisfaction. The axioms do not explain what gives marks and sounds the semantic features they have.
Davidson distinguishes sharply between giving logical forms for sentences and giving analysis of individual words. But how robust is that distinction? The intuitive idea that Davidson is working with is that in attributing logical forms we do not break words down into parts, but in lexical analyses we do. [Yet] Davidson's own theory of adverbs construes sentences containing adverbs as quantifications over events with predicates of events. The logical form here is quite different from the superficial syntax of the sentence. The paraphrase finds hidden semantic complexity in adverbs. Why isn't this a case of lexical analysis?
Colin McGinn, in his book The Philosophy of Language, discusses at least four criticisms of Davidson's theory.
Is it enough to say that knowledge of meaning is knowledge of truth conditions - especially when we restrict ourselves homophonic statements of truth conditions? Can't we ask what this knowledge of truth conditions itself involves?
We need to assign more than reference to a name if we are to capture its full meaning. We need something like sense. But Tarski's semantic apparatus does not specify sense. How then can it function as a theory of meaning. At best it is a theory of reference.
Davidson's theory provides no explanation of how words come to have semantic properties. The axioms say things like "'Hesperus' denotes Hesperus", but nothing in the theory tells us how it is that a word like "Hesperus" acquires reference. Similarly for predicates and satisfaction. The axioms do not explain what gives marks and sounds the semantic features they have.
Davidson distinguishes sharply between giving logical forms for sentences and giving analysis of individual words. But how robust is that distinction? The intuitive idea that Davidson is working with is that in attributing logical forms we do not break words down into parts, but in lexical analyses we do. [Yet] Davidson's own theory of adverbs construes sentences containing adverbs as quantifications over events with predicates of events. The logical form here is quite different from the superficial syntax of the sentence. The paraphrase finds hidden semantic complexity in adverbs. Why isn't this a case of lexical analysis?
edited 3 hours ago
answered 3 hours ago
Nick RNick R
2,977926
2,977926
Thanks for this. I'd be happy to think a bit about it, but I'd need to have the words that Davidson and Colin used in order to deal with the meanings of the criticisms (and I have other priorities...!), but if you want to work with me we can figure this out. I have some questions about your questions, though. Is it enough to say that knowledge of meaning is knowledge of truth Does this use of the term ‘knowledge’ refer to uncertain knowledge? Can't we ask what this knowledge of truth conditions itself involves? Umm, why wouldn’t we? Preconceptions don’t work in my perspective.
– Rortian
3 hours ago
2.We need to assign more than reference to a name if we are to capture its full meaning. We need something like sense. But Tarski's semantic apparatus does not specify sense. How then can it function as a theory of meaning. At best it is a theory of reference. Does "full meaning" refer to objective meaning? In the absence of "full" objectivity, I'm not clear that Davidson would dispute this...are you clear about what Davidson would think? Unfortunately, he won't be able to tell us...we can be fairly certain and quite correct about that...
– Rortian
3 hours ago
3. Umm, didn't Davidson accept Wittgenstein's approach? Does McGinn agree?
– Rortian
3 hours ago
4.Davidson distinguishes sharply between giving logical forms for sentences and giving analysis of individual words. But how robust is that distinction? Didn't Wittgenstein develop the theory of language games to overcome the insuperable difficulty of demonstrating that words carry meanings? Utterances occur in sociolinguistic contexts, right? They're interpreted - it seemed to some people and still does - according the history of learning of whoever connotes them...how do you assess how "superficial" syntax is or how "complex" the semantics are...why does that matter?
– Rortian
3 hours ago
1
@Rortian McGinn's book is an introductory, undergraduate level text which surveys ten classic papers in the philosophy of language. I don't think he has an agenda, as such. He characterises Davidson's response to such criticisms as being that from the point of view of philosophical semantics he has achieved his aim - namely, to specify meanings systematically and show how an "infinite mastery can proceed from a finite basis." According to McGinn, Davidson leaves it to psychologists to say more about linguistic meaning. I currently lack sufficient understanding to add to McGinn's comments.
– Nick R
2 hours ago
|
show 2 more comments
Thanks for this. I'd be happy to think a bit about it, but I'd need to have the words that Davidson and Colin used in order to deal with the meanings of the criticisms (and I have other priorities...!), but if you want to work with me we can figure this out. I have some questions about your questions, though. Is it enough to say that knowledge of meaning is knowledge of truth Does this use of the term ‘knowledge’ refer to uncertain knowledge? Can't we ask what this knowledge of truth conditions itself involves? Umm, why wouldn’t we? Preconceptions don’t work in my perspective.
– Rortian
3 hours ago
2.We need to assign more than reference to a name if we are to capture its full meaning. We need something like sense. But Tarski's semantic apparatus does not specify sense. How then can it function as a theory of meaning. At best it is a theory of reference. Does "full meaning" refer to objective meaning? In the absence of "full" objectivity, I'm not clear that Davidson would dispute this...are you clear about what Davidson would think? Unfortunately, he won't be able to tell us...we can be fairly certain and quite correct about that...
– Rortian
3 hours ago
3. Umm, didn't Davidson accept Wittgenstein's approach? Does McGinn agree?
– Rortian
3 hours ago
4.Davidson distinguishes sharply between giving logical forms for sentences and giving analysis of individual words. But how robust is that distinction? Didn't Wittgenstein develop the theory of language games to overcome the insuperable difficulty of demonstrating that words carry meanings? Utterances occur in sociolinguistic contexts, right? They're interpreted - it seemed to some people and still does - according the history of learning of whoever connotes them...how do you assess how "superficial" syntax is or how "complex" the semantics are...why does that matter?
– Rortian
3 hours ago
1
@Rortian McGinn's book is an introductory, undergraduate level text which surveys ten classic papers in the philosophy of language. I don't think he has an agenda, as such. He characterises Davidson's response to such criticisms as being that from the point of view of philosophical semantics he has achieved his aim - namely, to specify meanings systematically and show how an "infinite mastery can proceed from a finite basis." According to McGinn, Davidson leaves it to psychologists to say more about linguistic meaning. I currently lack sufficient understanding to add to McGinn's comments.
– Nick R
2 hours ago
Thanks for this. I'd be happy to think a bit about it, but I'd need to have the words that Davidson and Colin used in order to deal with the meanings of the criticisms (and I have other priorities...!), but if you want to work with me we can figure this out. I have some questions about your questions, though. Is it enough to say that knowledge of meaning is knowledge of truth Does this use of the term ‘knowledge’ refer to uncertain knowledge? Can't we ask what this knowledge of truth conditions itself involves? Umm, why wouldn’t we? Preconceptions don’t work in my perspective.
– Rortian
3 hours ago
Thanks for this. I'd be happy to think a bit about it, but I'd need to have the words that Davidson and Colin used in order to deal with the meanings of the criticisms (and I have other priorities...!), but if you want to work with me we can figure this out. I have some questions about your questions, though. Is it enough to say that knowledge of meaning is knowledge of truth Does this use of the term ‘knowledge’ refer to uncertain knowledge? Can't we ask what this knowledge of truth conditions itself involves? Umm, why wouldn’t we? Preconceptions don’t work in my perspective.
– Rortian
3 hours ago
2.We need to assign more than reference to a name if we are to capture its full meaning. We need something like sense. But Tarski's semantic apparatus does not specify sense. How then can it function as a theory of meaning. At best it is a theory of reference. Does "full meaning" refer to objective meaning? In the absence of "full" objectivity, I'm not clear that Davidson would dispute this...are you clear about what Davidson would think? Unfortunately, he won't be able to tell us...we can be fairly certain and quite correct about that...
– Rortian
3 hours ago
2.We need to assign more than reference to a name if we are to capture its full meaning. We need something like sense. But Tarski's semantic apparatus does not specify sense. How then can it function as a theory of meaning. At best it is a theory of reference. Does "full meaning" refer to objective meaning? In the absence of "full" objectivity, I'm not clear that Davidson would dispute this...are you clear about what Davidson would think? Unfortunately, he won't be able to tell us...we can be fairly certain and quite correct about that...
– Rortian
3 hours ago
3. Umm, didn't Davidson accept Wittgenstein's approach? Does McGinn agree?
– Rortian
3 hours ago
3. Umm, didn't Davidson accept Wittgenstein's approach? Does McGinn agree?
– Rortian
3 hours ago
4.Davidson distinguishes sharply between giving logical forms for sentences and giving analysis of individual words. But how robust is that distinction? Didn't Wittgenstein develop the theory of language games to overcome the insuperable difficulty of demonstrating that words carry meanings? Utterances occur in sociolinguistic contexts, right? They're interpreted - it seemed to some people and still does - according the history of learning of whoever connotes them...how do you assess how "superficial" syntax is or how "complex" the semantics are...why does that matter?
– Rortian
3 hours ago
4.Davidson distinguishes sharply between giving logical forms for sentences and giving analysis of individual words. But how robust is that distinction? Didn't Wittgenstein develop the theory of language games to overcome the insuperable difficulty of demonstrating that words carry meanings? Utterances occur in sociolinguistic contexts, right? They're interpreted - it seemed to some people and still does - according the history of learning of whoever connotes them...how do you assess how "superficial" syntax is or how "complex" the semantics are...why does that matter?
– Rortian
3 hours ago
1
1
@Rortian McGinn's book is an introductory, undergraduate level text which surveys ten classic papers in the philosophy of language. I don't think he has an agenda, as such. He characterises Davidson's response to such criticisms as being that from the point of view of philosophical semantics he has achieved his aim - namely, to specify meanings systematically and show how an "infinite mastery can proceed from a finite basis." According to McGinn, Davidson leaves it to psychologists to say more about linguistic meaning. I currently lack sufficient understanding to add to McGinn's comments.
– Nick R
2 hours ago
@Rortian McGinn's book is an introductory, undergraduate level text which surveys ten classic papers in the philosophy of language. I don't think he has an agenda, as such. He characterises Davidson's response to such criticisms as being that from the point of view of philosophical semantics he has achieved his aim - namely, to specify meanings systematically and show how an "infinite mastery can proceed from a finite basis." According to McGinn, Davidson leaves it to psychologists to say more about linguistic meaning. I currently lack sufficient understanding to add to McGinn's comments.
– Nick R
2 hours ago
|
show 2 more comments
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1
How does the IEP quote on Wittgenstein "reflect a consensus in the field that Wittgenstein’s theory, developed over half a century ago, has yet to be superseded"? I don't see it.
– Eliran
5 hours ago
@Eliran I'm guessing that this is because W's theory goes beyond the minimalism of D's theory by adding modal imagination to our concept of meaning.
– Nick R
4 hours ago
1
"Refute" is a strong word. Are you asking about criticisms.
– Nick R
4 hours ago
1
It would help if you didn't have off-topic asides like the sentence about Sherrat complimenting Davidson. And this first paragraph is over-laboured too.
– curiousdannii
53 mins ago
1
@Rortian Of course I'm not certain all my beliefs are absolutely true. Not sure what that's got to do with improving this question and helping you make it more focused and concise.
– curiousdannii
32 mins ago